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Video Surveillance, Evidence and PIPEDA:
A Comment on Ferenczy v. MCI Medical Clinics
By Anne Uteck†
One of the most common uses of surveillance is in It was relevant evidence and the probative value out-
the area of evidence gathering for investigation by liti- weighed its prejudicial effect. 6
gators. Private investigators have long been retained for The plaintiff’s counsel objected to the use of the
this purpose, and law enforcement officers routinely surveillance evidence on the basis that it was personal
utilize surveillance devices to assist in the prosecution of information collected in the course of commercial
a crime. The admissibility of video surveillance evidence activity without the plaintiff’s consent, in contravention
obtained by private and government investigators is of PIPEDA. Dawson J. ruled that even if personal infor-
obviously not a new issue. 1 What has come to the fore- mation was collected by video surveillance without the
front is the application of the Personal Information Pro- plaintiff’s consent, there is no provision under PIPEDA
tection and Electronic Documents Act2 in the context of that prohibits its admissibility. 7 Rather, PIPEDA provides
video surveillance evidence, and its impact on civil liti- a process for complaints to be made to the federal Pri-
gators. Privacy interests inherent in the collection, use, vacy Commissioner, but the Court indicated that it ‘‘has
and disclosure of personal information may be protected no direct impact on the admissibility of evidence in this
under PIPEDA, which clearly adds another consideration trial’’. 8 While this was enough to settle the admissibility
to the issue of admissibility of surveillance evidence. The question in this case, Dawson J. went on to consider the
impact of PIPEDA on video surveillance evidence in the application of PIPEDA in the context of video surveil-
employment context has been addressed by the federal lance, making three notable findings. First, he found that
Privacy Commissioner, who has assessed the legitimacy the making of the videotape was not a commercial
of surveillance on a ‘‘reasonableness’’ standard. 3 The activity because the private investigator was an agent of
Ontario Superior Court, in Ferenczy v. MCI Medical the doctor who was collecting information to defend
Clinics, 4 has now interpreted PIPEDA in the litigation himself against the lawsuit. This was, in Dawson J.’s view,
context in which a private investigator was used to a ‘‘personal purpose’’, and therefore, outside the applica-
gather information by video surveillance. While much of tion of PIPEDA. Second, even if PIPEDA did apply, by
Dawson J.’s decision is obiter, his analysis with respect to commencing the action, the plaintiff had given implied
video surveillance and PIPEDA may be an indication of consent to the collection, use, and disclosure of personal
how courts will deal with investigative evidence col- information insofar as it related to the lawsuit. And
lected in the litigation process. The end result in Fer- finally, even if there was no implied consent on the part
enczy is likely correct, but Dawson J.’s PIPEDA analysis of the plaintiff, the exception provisions under PIPEDA
appears to be a fairly transparent effort to avoid trans- applied, which permitted the defendant’s collection, use,
forming litigation ‘‘into something very different than it and disclosure of personal information without consent.
is today’’. 5 While the insurance industry may have
breathed a sigh of relief, for privacy advocates, this deci-
sion is likely a cause for concern. Commercial Activity and Agency The plaintiff in Ferenczy commenced an action
against her doctor for medical malpractice in the treat- he video surveillance was conducted by a licensed
ment of removing a cyst from her wrist. At trial, she T private investigator hired by the Canadian Medical
testified that it was difficult to grasp a cup with her Protective Agency (CMPA), which, inter alia, provides
injured left hand. At that point in the cross-examination, legal assistance to physicians who are sued for medical
defense counsel sought to admit video surveillance evi- malpractice. The plaintiff argued that the private investi-
dence taken by a private investigator hired by the defen- gator paid by the CMPA was collecting and making a
dant showing the plaintiff holding a Tim Horton’s coffee record of the plaintiff’s personal information in the
cup for a period of time in her left hand. The Court course of commercial activity without her consent.
ruled that the surveillance tape could be admitted in the Dawson J. disagreed, finding that the correct interpreta-
cross-examination of the plaintiff to impugn credibility. tion of PIPEDA is to view the investigator as an agent of






























































158 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
the doctor who was collecting, using, and disclosing the as inevitably, PIPEDA will be argued by plaintiffs seeking
information for the doctor’s ‘‘personal use to defend to exclude video surveillance evidence.
against allegations brought by the plaintiff’’. 9 Thus,
PIPEDA did not apply because the information was
being collected for ‘‘personal or domestic purposes’’ 10 Implied Consent 
and not in the course of commercial activity.
awson J. concluded that even if PIPEDA did apply,This interpretation seems a considerable stretch of D by starting the action, the plaintiff had giventhe ‘ ‘ personal purpose ’ ’ exception under para- implied consent to the collection and use of the personalgraph 4(2)(b). The defendant had, at least, a professional information insofar as it related to defending the lawsuit,interest in gathering information in defending the law- particularly in the circumstances where the recordingsuit. The term ‘‘commercial activity’’ is defined very was done in a public place. In his view, the plaintiff mustbroadly under PIPEDA as including every transaction, have known that she was putting her injury and itsact, or conduct that is of a commercial character, effects on her life into issue. Having started this action, itwhether it is a single transaction or occurs in the regular could not be said, according to Dawson J., that the plain-course of business conduct. 11 This arguably captures the tiff did not consent to the gathering of informationCMPA, on behalf of the defendant doctor, retaining a about the nature and extent of her injury. 14commercial investigator to collect personal information
Under PIPEDA, personal information can only beabout the plaintiff. Dawson J. found the way to avoid this
collected, used, and disclosed with the knowledge andconclusion, or an unfair result, was to characterize the
consent of the individual. 15 The Act contemplates thatdoctor’s interest in collecting the information as per-
implied consent may be appropriate in certain circum-sonal, thus setting up the agency theory.
stances. 16 Dawson J. may, implicitly, be making a reason-Given the lengths to which Dawson J. appears to go ableness assessment. However, without any express refer-to take this litigation outside the application of PIPEDA, ence or consideration of ‘‘reasonableness’’, 17 Ferenczythe question arises as to what effect the new PIPEDA casts a broad net for capturing personal information,Regulations, presumably not available prior to the ren- allowing defendants to rely on implied consent to collectdering of this decision, would have made on Dawson J.’s and disclose personal information in any number of dis-analysis. The result in Ferenczy is not inconsistent with putes being litigated. The impact of PIPEDA may call forthe amended PIPEDA Regulations dealing with investi- a more nuanced discussion of when and to what extentgative bodies. 12 Paragraphs 7(3)(d) and (h.2) permit the some kinds of personal information can be collected fordisclosure of personal information to and by an investi- the purposes of civil litigation.gative body without the knowledge and consent of the
Notwithstanding its far-reaching implications, evenindividual if the investigative body is specified by the
if one accepts that starting a civil action implies consentRegulations. The new Regulations amend the definition
to gather personal information for the purposes of veri-of ‘‘investigative bodies’’ to include licensed private inves-
fying a claim, how broadly can a plaintiff expect informa-tigators or detectives. 13 It is made clear that the disclo-
tion about his or her injury and its effects on his or hersure of personal information to and by private investiga-
life be to collected and disclosed? The collection of per-tors without knowledge and consent is permitted. The
sonal information is still subject to the reasonablenessissue in Ferenczy was whether the information could be
standard provided in PIPEDA.18 Dawson J. assumes thecollected in the first place, and in any event, Dawson J.
collection of the information was reasonable, but doesfound the defendant’s collection and disclosure of the
not articulate criteria upon which this assessment isplaintiff’s personal information by the private investi-
made.gator to be for personal purposes. On the other hand, the
amended privacy regulations seem to remove any doubt Prior to the enactment of PIPEDA, courts generally
that private investigators are subject to PIPEDA. The reg- found plaintiffs to have, at best, a reduced expectation of
ulations merely add them to the named ‘‘investigative privacy in public places, allowing defendants to use pri-
bodies’’ that can disclose personal information without vate investigators to conduct video surveillance of a
knowledge and consent. Presumably this was done to plaintiff, provided there was a legitimate purpose for the
ensure the investigative body would be able to disclose surveillance, such as gathering information relevant to a
the results of its investigation (the collection of informa- lawsuit, and where the observation was not so constant
tion) to its client or other interested parties without con- and obtrusive as to go beyond reasonable bounds. 19 In
sent. The amendment suggests that PIPEDA was the employment context, video surveillance evidence has
intended to apply to private investigators retained to been admitted if the employer satisfied the three-
conduct surveillance for the purpose of verifying the pronged test established in arbitral jurisprudence. 20
legitimacy of a personal injury claim. Courts may not, Where employers undertake investigative video surveil-
therefore, find it necessary to resort to the application of lance of employees outside the workplace, the employer
the Ferenczy agency theory to private investigators in the must demonstrate that initiating the surveillance was
litigation context where PIPEDA is raised. It will, how- reasonable in all the circumstances, that it was con-
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paragraph 7(1)(b) is that the collection must be reason-other alternatives available to the employer to obtain the
able, mirroring the subsection 5(3) reasonableness stan-evidence sought. PIPEDA is consistent with these
dard. The absence of any discussion on the reasonable-approaches by mandating that a reasonableness standard
ness of the surveillance weakens the overall analysis ofbe applied to information-gathering by surveillance. This
the impact of PIPEDA in relation to video surveillance increates an important limitation on those collecting per-
the litigation context because an effective balancesonal information. Surveillance activities that a reason-
between the plaintiff’s privacy interests and the defen-able person would not consider appropriate cannot be
dant’s interests in defending himself  or herself has notjustified.
been achieved. The third requirement under para-Ferenczy falls short here by assuming that implied graph 7(1)(b) was given a wide interpretation by Dawsonconsent in the litigation context justifies the collection of J. so as not to limit the exception to contractual breachespersonal information by video surveillance in public or fraudulent acts that violate federal or provincial laws.places, without taking into account the reasonableness of The broad reading appears to contemplate that personalthe surveillance. In the end, the result would probably information can be collected and disclosed during anynot have been different, given the circumstances of loca- litigation process and that the paragraph 7(1)(b) excep-tion and purpose of the surveillance and the likelihood tion extends to non-agreement situations.of meeting the reasonableness test as required under
An Ontario arbitration decision has considered thesubsection 5(3) of PIPEDA. However, the decision leaves
application of PIPEDA in relation to video surveillanceopen the extent and nature of information-gathering a
evidence, ruling that the surveillance evidence was inad-plaintiff is actually consenting to. The question remains
missible because it was obtained in violation of para-as to whether a plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of
graph 7(1)(b). 25 In Ross, the employee was terminated forprivacy. Ferenczy leads to the conclusion that there is no
misrepresenting his health status. The employee had suf-expectation of privacy in public places once an action is
fered a back injury while at work. He was off work andcommenced. Surely, PIPEDA is of some consequence in
then placed on administrative duties to accommodatethe litigation process where there is a need to balance
his injury. After several months, he continued to claimthe rights of the defendant to gather the facts and verify
he was unable to resume his duties as a truck driver.the legitimacy of the claim with the privacy rights of the
Informing his supervisor that he would be movingplaintiff.
during his upcoming vacation, the employer hired a pri-
vate investigator to conduct video surveillance of the
employee who was filmed moving furniture. The arbi-Exemption from Consent
trator found the consent exception in paragraph 7(1)(b)Requirement was inapplicable, ruling that there were no reasonable
he most interesting finding by Justice Dawson is grounds for the investigation:T that even if his previous conclusions are incorrect, There were any number of other means that were available
the exception to the consent principle in section 7 of to the employer to test the true extent of Ross’ restrictions
and the bona fides of his recovery . . . This is a case, wherePIPEDA applies. Specifically, paragraph 7(1)(b) provides
the employer, without any evidence that the employee wasthat personal information can be collected without con-
malingering or had made misrepresentations or spread dis-sent if ‘‘it is reasonable to expect that the collection with information as to his physical abilities, orders surreptitiousthe knowledge or consent of the individual would com- video surveillance in the hope of trapping the unsuspecting
promise the availability or the accuracy of the informa- employee during the course of moving furniture at his place
of residence at a time and place that he had voluntarilytion and the collection is reasonable for [the] purpose
disclosed to his employer. 26related to investigating a breach of an agreement or a
contravention of the laws of Canada or a province’’. 21 In the arbitrator’s view, the employer’s interests do
Justice Dawson held that ‘‘the laws of Canada or a prov- not justify random video surveillance to see what it can
ince’’ includes the common law, including the law of catch. Rather, surveillance is an extraordinary step that
tort, and that the video surveillance ‘‘related to investiga- can only be resorted to where there is reasonable and
tion’’ of a tort claim.22 Further, conducting the video probable cause to justify it. 27 The employer ‘‘attempted
surveillance with the plaintiff’s knowledge or consent to cast an electronic web to see whether it could catch
would ‘‘compromise the availability or accuracy of the the employee while moving his family’’. 28 The gathering
information’’. 23 Therefore, in Justice’s Dawson’s view, of personal information by video surveillance was ‘‘not
since paragraph 7(1)(b) applied, the plaintiff’s personal reasonable for any purpose related to the investigation of
information could be collected without her consent and a breach of the employment agreement’’. 29 Thus, its col-
used without her consent ,  pursuant to para- lection without the knowledge or consent of the
graph 7(2)(d). 24 employee was contrary to PIPEDA. Although the
Arguably, most cases where it is necessary to verify employer could rely on paragraph 7(1)(b) insofar as it
the legitimacy of a personal injury, particularly those related to an investigation of a ‘‘breach of an agreement’’,
made by persons suspected of fraudulent claims, would the admissibility question ultimately failed by not
justify information-gathering by video surveillance and meeting the reasonableness standard imposed under the
be captured by the first of the three-prong requirements Act. The decision is somewhat surprising, given that the





























































160 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
suspect the employee was committing fraud. However, In the end, Ferenczy is notable not so much for
Ross indicates that organizations wishing to rely on para- what was said, but the implications of what was not
graph 7(1)(b) of PIPEDA must have a reasonable basis for discussed in any depth, namely the reasonable expecta-
undertaking surveillance. tion of privacy and the reasonableness of the surveil-
lance. Not surprisingly, Justice Dawson concludes byEven if courts follow Ferenczy’s broad reading of
stating that PIPEDA ‘‘leaves a lot to be desired in terms ofparagraph 7(1)(b), at least some consideration has to be
clarity and usefulness’’, and in particular, with regard togiven to the reasonableness qualifier. Ross and the fed-
the conduct of litigation. 31 His analysis and interpreta-eral Privacy Commissioner’s findings 30 may provide
tion of the Act says as much. Ferenczy likely reaches thesome guidance as to how reasonableness will be inter-
correct result, but marginalizes the impact of PIPEDA.preted in the context of video surveillance and PIPEDA,
although the extent to which this type of analysis will be It can be expected that plaintiffs will continue to
applied in the civil litigation process is uncertain. Had challenge the admissibility of video surveillance evidence
Dawson J. considered the reasonableness qualifier in his by raising PIPEDA for reasons related to genuine privacy
analysis, and assuming there was a reasonable basis for concerns. Fraudulent personal injury claims will also
conducting the surveillance of this plaintiff, the result continue. For the reasons stated, Ferenczy does not
would likely be the same. However, subject to the cir- resolve the issue of investigative evidence and the impact
cumstances leading to the surveillance activity, another of PIPEDA in the litigation context. It is, however, the
court could reach a different conclusion when assessing first case to provide assistance to civil litigators on how
whether the collection of personal information by video courts will interpret PIPEDA, and as such, cannot be
surveillance was reasonable. For example, if only reason- ignored.
able surveillance measures may be used, intrusive surveil-
lance activity may constitute a violation of PIPEDA
where the information was capable of being gathered by
other means.
Notes:
1 As a general rule, relevant evidence is admissible subject to a discretion to 14 Ferenczy, supra note 3 at para. 31.
exclude the evidence where the probative value is outweighed by its 15 PIPEDA, supra note 2, Schedule A, Principle 3, Cl. 4.3.prejudicial effect. See, for example, R. v. Morris, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 190 and J.
16 Ibid., Cl. 4.3.4.Sopinka, S.N. Lederman and A.W. Bryant, The Law of Evidence in
Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1999) at 23. 17 PIPEDA, supra note 2, subsection 5(3) provides that an ‘‘organization may
collect, use or disclose personal information only for purposes that a2 S.C. 2000, c. 5 [hereinafter PIPEDA].
reasonable person would consider appropriate in the circumstances’’.3 See, for example, PIPEDA Case Summaries #114, #264, #265, #273, and
#279, available at http://www.privcom.gc.ca, Commissioner’s Findings. See 18 Ibid.
also Finding #269, where an employer hired a private investigator to 19 See, for example, Druken v. R.G. Fewer and Associates, Inc. (1998), 171conduct video surveillance on an employee in order to determine the Nfld. & P.E.I.R., 312 (Nfld. T.D.); Penny v. Manitoba Public Insuranceveracity of his medical condition. The Assistant Privacy Commissioner Corp. (1991), 72 Man. R. (2d) 10 (Q.B.); Rusche v. Insurance Corp ofclearly recommends that video surveillance outside the workplace is to be British Columbia (1992), 4 C.P.C. (3d) 12 (B.C.S.C.); and Unger v. Lutzused as a last resort, should only be contemplated if all other avenues of (1996), 24 B.C.L.R. (3d) 124 (S.C.).collecting personal information have been exhausted, and private investi-
20 Re Doman Forest Products Ltd. and International Woodworkers, Localgators should be instructed to collect personal information in accordance
I-357 (1990) 13 L.A.C. (4th) 275 (Vickers, B.C.); Re Toronto Star Newspa-with PIPEDA.
pers Ltd. and Southern Ontario Newspaper Guild, Local 87 (1992), 304 70 O.R. (3d) 277 [hereinafter Ferenczy]. L.A.C. (4th) 306 (Springate, Ont.); Re Labatt Ontario Breweries (Toronto
5 Ibid., at para. 27. Brewery) and Brewery, General & Professional Workers Union, Local 304
(1994), 42 L.A.C. (4th) 151 (Brandt, Ont.); Re Greater Vancouver Regional6 Ibid., at para. 16.
District and Greater Vancouver Regional District Employees’ Union7 Dawson J. acknowledges that information gathered by video surveillance (1996), 57 L.A.C. (4th) 113 (McPhillips, B.C.); and Re Toronto Transitis captured by the definition of ‘‘personal information’’ under subsec- Commission and Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 113 (Russell)tion 2(1) of PIPEDA, ibid., at para. 22. (1999), 88 L.A.C. (4th) 109 (Shime, Ont.).
8 Ibid., at para. 15. 21 PIPEDA, supra note 2.
9 Ibid., at para. 30. 22 Ferenczy, supra note 4 at para. 33.10 PIPEDA, supra note 2. Under paragraph (4)(2)(b), the Act does not apply 23 Ibid.to ‘‘any individual in respect of personal information that the individual
collects, uses or discloses for personal or domestic purposes and does not 24 PIPEDA, supra note 2, paragraph 7(2)(d) provides that personal informa-
collect, use or disclose for any other purpose’’. tion can be used without knowledge or consent if it was collected under
paragraph 7(1)(b).11 Ibid., subsection 2(1). Note: The Ontario Superior Court of Justice, since
Ferenczy, had an opportunity to rule on the meaning of ‘‘commercial 25 Ross v. Rosedale Transport Ltd., [2003] C.L.A.D. No. 237, 2003 Car-
activity’’ in Rodgers v. Calvert, [2004] O.J. No. 3653. The Court found swellNat 3620 (Ont. Arb.) [hereafter Ross].
that the Peel County Game and Fish Protection Association was not 26 Ibid., at para. 36.involved in commercial activity in the sense of engaging in commerce
and trade. The case is limited in its application, but does provide some 27 Ibid.
insight as to what factors may be considered in assessing ‘‘commercial 28 Ibid., at para. 37.activity’’.
29 Ibid.12 The Regulations Specifying Investigative Bodies, S.O.R./2001-6, as am. By
30 Supra note 3.S.O.R./2004-60, section 1.
13 Ibid., subparagraphs 1(w)(i) and (ii); 1(x)(i) and (ii). 31 Supra note 4 at para. 34.
✄
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